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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGELA ALVARADO, an Infant, by 
HORTENCE ALVARADO, her Guardian 
Ad Litem, 
RONALD TUCKER, and 
HAROLD N. TUCKER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
Defendants 
and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 8043 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the Court below this was a personal injury action 
for damages. At the conclusion of the presentation of 
testimony offered in support of Plaintiff's Case, upon 
motion of Defendants' Counsel for dismissal, the Court 
directed the Jury to bring back a verdict of no cause for 
action. The Jury complied. 
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For the determination of the correctness of the 
Court's direction, the resulting verdict, and judgment, 
this appeal is brought. 
Throughout this brief, "R" is the judgment roll, 
"Tr" is the transcript of the proceedings at the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent issues on this appeal being the ques-
tion of whether there is anything in the record showing 
negligence on the part of the defendants which should 
have justified submission to the jury, and whether the 
record discloses such negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff that, as a matter of law, she cannot recover; the 
statement of facts are primarily directed to these issues 
and but briefly as to non issues of the appeal. 
ANGELA ALVARADO, a child 12 years old De-
cember 11, 1952, but prior thereto being but 11 years 
old (Tr. 7) on March 17, 1952 (Tr. 70) between the 
hours of 6 P. M. and a quarter to 7 <R 07, Tr. 34) was 
injured by being hit by an automobile (Tr. 33,39) oper-
ated by defendant Ronald Tucker on Eccles Avenue be-
tween 22nd and 23rd Streets, in Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah (R 07). She and four other children had been 
playing in the street (Tr. 8) and sidewalk (Tr. 13). She 
had waited for a car to go by, then started to walk across 
the street and was going from the West side to the East 
side when she was struck (Tr. 9). She was hospitalized 
and suffered shock, multiple bruises and abrasions of her 
shoulders and thighs, bruised hips, fracture of the right 
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thigh, and compound fracture of the right lower leg in-
volving both bones (Tr. 49-50). Testimony varied from 
its being still light when the child commenced to play 
(Tr. 75); to its being dark (Tr. 34) at the time of the 
injury; lights on the Tucker car were on <Tr. 32); the 
Tucker car was proceeding South on Eccles Avenue <Tr. 
25). The speed limit in this location is 25 miles per hour 
(Tr. 65). After the accident the child's body was be-
tween 10 and IS feet (Tr. 25, 36) from the front of the 
Tucker car. The Tucker car was four or five feet east of 
the automobile of witness Dorothy W ardleigh, and her 
car was parked within six inches of the west curb of 
Eccles Avenue (Tr. 39). This witness heard a screech 
of brakes, saw car hit a body or an object, saw the body 
or object in the air over the top of her car, went out and 
saw it was the little girl in the street (Tr. 32, 33). Wit-
ness William Glen Norton heard screech of brakes, saw 
his sister pushed off the west side of the car, saw where 
Angela was laying (Tr. 24, 25). The child did not hear 
any brakes before she was hit (Tr. 18). Skid marks were 
found running North of where the Tucker car was the 
following day by witness W ardleigh, they were black 
<Tr. 37). They were paced off by witness A. J. McFar-
land the following day and were seventeen steps in 
length, which he, a retired railroad carpenter, said was 
SO feet. <Tr. 43). The witness LeRoy G. Bennett, in 
charge of the traffic division of the Ogden City Police 
Department (Tr. 57) testified that 51 feet of skid marks, 
according to chart used by the department, with 80Yo 
coefficient of friction, would show a probable speed of 
an automobile as being 35 miles per hour <Tr. 63); the 
actual distance traveled where SO feet of skid marks as 
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shown, would be about 40 feet, and the chart, using 65% 
coefficient of friction, shows, if 46 feet, speed would be 
30 miles per hour; at 32 feet, speed would be 25 miles 
per hour; so somewhere between 25 and 35 miles per 
hour would be the speed of the car dependent upon the 
various assumed factors of skid marks and percentage of 
coefficient of friction <Tr. 66); that the reaction time of 
an individual is three quarters of a second, and 38% feet 
is traveled by a car going 35 miles per hour during the 
reaction time; <Tr. 64); that the difference in distance 
traveled by a car going 25 miles per hour and one going 
35 miles per hour, during reaction time, is 11 feet (Tr. 
65). 
The stipulations of the parties were to the effect that 
if the defendant RONALD TUCKER was liable, the de-
fendant HAROLD N. TUCKER, the father, was liable 
(Tr. 5, R010); and that $1,316.65 was what could be con-
sidered as being the value of services rendered by the hos-
pital, doctor and dentist, obviating testimony with respect 
thereto (Tr. 6, ROIO). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I . There was evidence showing negligence of the 
defendants sufficient to warrant and to require the sub-
mission thereof to the jury. 
2. There was no showing in the record, of negli-
gence on the part of the Plaintiff, from which it can be 
held, that she cannot, as a matter of law, recover. 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION I. THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOW-
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lNG NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS SUFFI-
CIENT TO REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION THEREOF 
TO THE JURY. 
The expressed grounds and reasons underlying the 
trial Judge's determination to direct the Jury to bring 
back a verdict of no cause for action, are expressed by the 
Court, as, it was dark; the children were playing on the 
sidewalk; no evidence the driver could have seen the 
children outside of his headlights, whether they were high 
or low; the child ran from one automobile around directly 
from back of that automobile (Tr. 78), fairly appears to 
appellant to show the thinking of the trial Judge to be 
1. that no evidence is in the record of defendant's negli-
gence, and 2. that the plaintiff was negligent. It is to 
this first proposition or point that this brief will now deal. 
The theory of the plaintiff, in the trial, on the mat-
ter of negligence of defendants is expressed in the open-
ing statement: 
"We believe that the evidence will show that at 
that time and place the operation of that motor 
vehicle was negligent in that the speed of the car 
was in excess of the lawful rate of speed for that 
location here in Ogden and under the conditions 
and circumstances which existed" (Tr. 4). 
Supporting this theory on the element of speed, it 
was shown that 25 miles per hour was the lawful rate of 
speed; that the car laid down black skid marks for SO 
feet, and that such evidenced the car as having been 
traveling as much as 35 miles per hour, or between 25 
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miles per hour and 35 miles per hour, and that the dis-
tance a car would travel between the time of observation 
of a condition necessitating a stoppage of a vehicle trav-
eling at the rate of 35 miles per hour over that of a vehicle 
traveling at the rate of 25 miles per hour is 11 feet, and 
showing further that the traveled distance during there-
action time of a car traveling at the rate of 35 miles per 
hour is 38.5 feet, while at 25 miles per hour but 27% 
feet. 
The child was in the center of the street when she 
alighted, the defendants' car too was in the center of the 
street. It was the child Karen who was pushed off of the 
West side of the car, not the plaintiff. 
The speed force necessary to hurtle an eleven year 
old child through the air, visible by a witness observing 
over her own car parked at the curb, and to such a dis-
tance that when the car was brought to a stop, even then 
there was from 10 to IS feet between the front of the car 
and the child lying South of the car, is a factor in the 
case. 
On the element of conditions and circumstances 
which existed, the proof of negligence is, it must be con-
fessed, not overwhelming and free from uncertainty, it 
being now seen that from ought that appeared the chil-
dren had not been in the street for I 5 minutes prior to 
the injury, if we take literally the testimony of the child 
elicited under cross examination, and close our mind 
and judgment as to just how and what children do in 
their play, and in tag particularly, and give full credit for 
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the ability of the child accurately to judge time, nor was 
the familiarity of the driver with this avenue and the 
usual custom and habits of the children to the extensive 
use of the particular avenue shown, but under this ele-
ment, the testimony is not without prohibitive value. It 
appears that a car parked within 6 inches of the curb, 
plus the width of the car, plus a space of 4 or 5 feet, plus 
the width of defendants' car was the center of the avenue. 
Such is therefore indicative of room for but two traffic 
lanes, North and South, which is a narrow space for 
operation of a motor vehicle even at the lawful rate of 
speed, and at speeds in excess thereof becomes increas-
ingly more dangerous. 
The plaintiff did not show, nor seek to show, nor 
claim that the lights on defendants' car were not oper-
ating. The testimony shows that the lights on defend-
ants' car were operating and further that there was light 
from the intersection of the avenue with 23rd Street. 
The case with respect to the light conditions are such as 
may fairly be drawn from the time element of from 6 P. 
M. to a quarter of 7 P. M., the head lights being on, and 
the street light being on, the ability of a witness on a 
porch on the east side of the street to see his sister pushed 
off the west side of the car on the west of the center of 
the street, are all factors with respect to the light condi-
tions. To what degree visibility was impaired by the 
lightness or darkness of the day on the happening of the 
accident is not without uncertainty to be sure, but from 
such evidence it is equally true that not all persons would 
say that it was so dark, that the drivers of automobiles 
could not have seen the children outside of the beam of 
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their headlights. However the darker the light condi-
tions, the more serious the excessive speed of the car. 
On the matter of defendants' negligence or lack of 
it, deducible from the facts in this case, it cannot be said, 
we believe, that there is no evidence whatever which sup-
ports or would tend to support an allegation of negli-
gence, and that, therefore, and as a matter of law, no 
negligence whatever was shown. 
The authorities supporting the position of the appel-
lant are as follows: 
On the matter of speed of the automobile in rela-
tion to speed limit, the texts indicate that some authori-
ties hold that violation of speed limit ordinance consti-
tutes negligence per se, and others hold that it is evidence 
of negligence merely. 5 Am. Jur. Automobiles 315, 319. 
On the matter of effect of ordinances generally with re-
spect to negligence, the same holdings are found. 38 Am. 
Jur. Negligence 168. 
See also, 46 A. L. R. 1046 where a collection of cases 
show speed ordinance violation to be negligence per se. 
Doubtless the best, most reasonable rule, is that 
speed in excess of speed limits is but evidence of negli-
gence, not negligence per se, and for its effective appli-
cation there must need be other facts and circumstances 
showing, or from which logical conclusions can be 
reached, that the excessive speed contributed to, (it, with 
other negligent acts), or was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. 
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On the matter of Proximate cause see 5 Am. Jur. 
Automobiles paragraph 164 
Proximate Cause 
"The well-established rule of law that in order to 
maintain an action for negligence, the injury of 
which the plaintiff complains must have been the 
natural and probable consequence of a wrongful 
act or omission which is not too remote obviously 
applies to automobile accidents. 
A negligent act cannot be said to be the proxi-
mate cause of an accident unless the accident 
could have been avoided in the absence thereof. 
Speed, in order to be the basis of a recovery for 
negligent injuries, must be the proximate cause 
of the injuries. 
* * * * 
The driver of an automobile is also relieved from 
liability when the proximate cause of an injury is 
the negligence of the person injured, although the 
exemption from responsibility in such cases is 
usually referred to as being due to the contributory 
negligence of the injured person. 
When once a chain of events has been started due 
to the negligence of the operator of an automo-
bile, he may be held responsible for all mishaps 
which are properly the proximate result of his un-
lawful conduct. The fact that other happenings 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
causing or contributing toward an injury inter-
vened between the violation of a statute or ordin-
ance and the injury does not necessarily make the 
result so remote that no action can be maintained. 
The test is to be found not in the number of in-
tervening events or agents, but in their character 
and in the natural and probable connection be-
tween them the wrong done and the injurious 
consequence. 
In determining what constitutes proximate cause, 
the same principles apply where the alleged negli-
gence consists of a violation of a statutory duty as 
where it consists of the violation of a non-statu-
tory duty. It is well settled that the violation of a 
statute or ordinance, to result in liability for in-
jury to person or property, must be a proximate 
cause of such injury." 
On the duty owed in regard to children playing in 
the street the general text statement with respect there-
to is, 5 Am. Jur. Automobiles, paragraph 186. 
Children Playing in Street. 
"Ordinarily it is the duty of a person operating 
an automobile in a street in which there is a 
group of children playing, not only to bring his 
automobile under control, but to give warning of 
his approach and to manage_ his car, keeping in 
mind the risk that children may not exercise the 
care for their own protection that adults are ex-
pected to exercise. The question of liability for 
10 
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injury to a child, for example, playing ball in the 
street, is not subject to any hard and fast rule. 
There is a reciprocal duty on the part of the 
driver and the child. Upon the driver there rests 
the duty, after discovering the presence of the 
child, to proceed with that degree of care that a 
careful man would exercise when faced with such 
a situation." 
PROPOSITION II. THERE WAS NO SHOWING IN 
THE RECORD OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF 
THE PLAINTIFF FROM WHICH IT CAN BE HELD 
THAT SHE CANNOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, RE-
COVER. 
The source of any showing in the record on the 
question of claimed negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff comes, if at all, is from the testimony of the plain-
tiff herself, of Hortense Alvarado, her mother, and from 
the testimony of William Glen Norton. 
Reviewing the evidence of these three, successively, 
which constitute the ingredients out of which must arise 
the resolution that plaintiff was irrefutably negligent, or 
that plaintiff was irrefutably not negligent, or that the 
facts could support a decision either way, the following is 
shown: 
ANGELA ALVARADO, a child 11 years and 3 
months, in the fourth grade in school, playing back in 
the street (Tr. 8) with four other children (Tr. 8) about 
Six Thirty or so (Tr. 9) we was just playing back out-
side, and I saw a car that was going to stop, and then, I 
11 
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waited for him to go by, and then I went around it and 
then I started to walk across the street, and then I don't 
remember (Tr. 9). 
A series of leading questions were propounded on 
cross examination tending to elicit responses to show 
Angela to have been playing tag along the side of the 
street on the sidewalk with four other children chasing 
each other, after supper, after dark, showing however 
also that they had been running across the street before 
the accident but not for about fifteen minutes before, and 
placing Angela as playing, running up and down the east 
sidewalk just before she ran out into the street, she and 
the other injured child being chased by her brother, not 
remembering which way they were running before she 
ran out across the street, then running along the side of 
one car next to the sidewalk and running behind the car 
and running thence across the street again without look-
ing to see if there were any cars coming from the other 
direction, with the other child ahead of her getting past 
the car Ronald was driving before she, Karen, got hit. 
WILLIAM GLEN NORTON 
A 17 -year-old boy, testifying that about Six Thirty 
Angela, among other children, were playing in the street, 
including his sister Karen. He saw his sister pushed off 
of the car. 
HORTENSE ALVARADO 
She permitted the child to play outside that day, she 
did not see the accident, she had let the child out pretty 
12 
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close to six o'clock and it was still light; she customarily 
let Angela play until about eight o'clock; Angela had been 
told from time to time to stay out of the street; she didn't 
know the child was playing in the street that night; how-
ever she knew that the children liked to play out in the 
street, the neighbor children too, for it was the only place 
they could play ball, and lots of times they would skate 
on their roller skates out in the street. 
From this and other similar testimony must the 
question of negligence-no negligence-or uncertainty as 
to which, must a decision be made. 
If, from such testimony, it can be said that as a mat-
ter of law Angela was negligent, then the decision of the 
trial Judge is unassailable, but if, from such testimony it 
can be said that Angela was not negligent, or that rea-
sonable persons might differ as to whether Angela's ac-
tions were negligent or not, then the matter is one for the 
jury and the action of the trial Judge a usurpation of the 
jury functions. 
The law and citations applicable to the ascertain-
ment of the correctness or error of the trial Judge, are as 
follows: 
In the case of Nelson et ux. v. Arrowhead Freight 
Lines, Limited. Smith et ux. v. same, 104 P 2d 225, the 
court says this with respect to persons 16 years of age: 
"-such a person is presumed to possess that dis-
cretion and physical capacity consistent with the 
safe use of the highways, and as setting an age at 
13 
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and above which the presumption of adult respon-. 
sibility attaches. 
emphasis added. 
Further in this same case the court states: 
"Between the ages of seven and fourteen, in the 
absence of showing to the contrary, an infant is 
generally assumed not to have the same conscious-
ness of danger and the same judgment in avoiding 
it as an adult." 
emphasis added. 
This case quotes with approval an excerpt from 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Volume 1, Section 99 
(a)' 
"The question as to whether a child's capacity is 
such that it may be chargeable with contributory 
negligence is a question of fact for the jury, unless 
so young and immature as to require the court to 
judicially know that it could not contribute to its 
own injury or be responsible for its acts, or so old 
and mature that the court must know that, though 
an infant, yet it is responsible. Where the infant 
is under fourteen years of age, the burden rests 
upon the defendant to rebut the legal presumption 
of incapability of contributory negligence. As to 
those over fourteen years of age the prima facie 
capability of ·negligence attaches. Each case must 
depend upon the intelligence and capacity of the 
14 
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child and the surrounding facts rather than upon 
any arbitrary rule. It cannot be said on the one 
hand that a child just past seven years is sui juris 
so as to be charged with negligence, nor, on the 
other hand, that a child just under that age is 
wholly incapable of exercising care. 
It has generally been held that, since there is no 
exact period fixed by law at which there is no 
doubt as to whether the child is sui juris, the ques-
tion of intelligence and ability to exercise care is 
for the jury under proper instructions from the 
court. But it has ben held that, in the absence 
of proof to the contrary, a child fourteen years of 
age is presumed to have sufficient capacity to be 
sensible of danger and to have the power to avoid 
•t " 1 • 
The crossing of a street at a place other than at a 
pedestrian lane, by even an adult, has been held to be a 
jury question, and denial of a motion for a directed ver-
dict sought by the defendant, was not error. Morton v. 
Hood, 143 P 2d 434. 
The withdrawal or withholding of a case from the 
jury where the evidence is conflicting, but where evi-
dence does exist which would sustain a jury's determina-
tion, whatever that jury might determine, appears to be 
improper, 53 Am. Jur. Trial, paragraph 299. 
Possibility of Different Conclusions. 
"A case cannot properly be withdrawn from the 
15 
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jury simply because, in the judgment of the court, 
there is a preponderance of evidence. A cause 
should never be withdrawn from the jury unless 
it appears, as matter of law, that a recovery can-
not be had upon any view of the facts which the 
evidence reasonably tends to establish. Where 
there is an issue of fact upon which reasonable 
minds might disagree, the court is not justified in 
withdrawing the case from the jury. If there is 
conflicting evidence, and any view that the jury 
might lawfully take of it will sustain their find-
ings for either party, the facts should not be with-
drawn from them." 
. CONCLUSION 
The facts and circumstances, is our sincere belief 
and contention, show the negligence of the defendants; 
the reversible error of the trial Judge in directing a ver-
dict of no cause for action; and the error of failing to sub-· 
mit the case to the Jury for its determination of the ques-
tion of whether the evidence in their judgment showed 
the defendants to have been negligent or not. 
And, further, that there is no showing in the record 
of chargeable negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and 
none from which it can be held the plaintiff cannot, as 
a matter of law, recover. 
In consequence, and for the reasons expressed here-
in, the Judgment and Verdict herein should be vacated 
16 
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and set aside; the directions of the trial Judge reversed; 
and a new trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
17 
DAVID K. HOL THER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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